The 100 K fuel storage basins, designated K East and K West, were constructed in the 1950s for initial storage and cooling of irradiated fuel from the K Reactors prior to shipment for plutonium extraction. The reactors and basins were shut down and deactivated in the early 1970s. Subsequently the basins, first K East, and later K West, were reactivated to store N Reactor fuel.
Current K Basin fuel handling and storage criticality safety limits are derived from a large number of criticality safety evaluations dating from 1969. In many cases, these documents were written to cover an aspect of operations (for example, N Reactor fuel storage) that are no longer applicable; however portions of the analyses are being used to support K Basin limits. In some cases the bases for storage or handling are not clearly defined or were derived from erroneous assumptions or misinterpretations of earlier analyses.
This evaluation consolidates the existing bases for fuel handling and storage in the K Basins and provides bases for currently-used limits in those cases where the derivation of the limits are unclear. It does not perform new analyses nor does it incorporate evaluations for fuel encapsulation, sludge cleanup, or plutonium accumulations in filtration components. Recent, detailed analyses using modern computer codes have been performed for these operations and conditions. Additionally, it does not provide a basis for eliminating the older CSERs. This document provides a summary of existing analyses and provides a means for applying them to facility operating limits, and provides bases for existing limits that do not have clearly-defined bases. 
Note on Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations
Several criticality safety evaluations have been prepared in the past in support of N Reactor and K Basins fuel storage. These evaluations assume that stored fuel is unirradiated and therefore contains the original amount of 235U; no credit is taken for burnup or the presence of fission product poisons. effect of this assumption is that 239Pu is not considered, the typical irradiation history of the fuel ensures that irradiated fuel is less reactive than unirradiated fuel. This was demonstrated by a subcritical experiment using both unirradiated and irradiated fuel (Toffer 1976). Calculated critical masses for both irradiated "safe exposure" and irradiated "average discharge exposure" were considerably higher than calculated critical masses for unexposed fuel. Thus the evaluations summarized in this document provide substantial conservatism.
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM AND FACILITY
Although the K Basins consists of two large water-filled basins (K East and K West) used to store irradiated fuel discharged from the N Reactor (see Figure 1 in Appendix B). Both basins have water filtration systems consisting of cartridge filters, a sand filter, and ion exchange modules. These components filter uranium, plutonium, and fission products from the basin water and may contain a measurable inventory of plutonium/uranium. The source of the uranium and plutonium is suspended and dissolved material from corroded fuel assemblies. Fuel at K East is stored in open canisters which allows uranium and plutonium corrosion products to become suspended in the basin water. Fuel at K West is stored in closed canisters and very little uranium or plutonium has leached into the basin water. Historical center-of-basin water samples show that the basin water plutonium concentration at K East is approximately three orders of magnitude higher than at K West.
Fuel is stored in double-barrelled canisters which hold a maximum of seven assemblies per barrel. Canisters are placed in racks (53 cm x 27 cm or 21" x 10.6") installed on the basin floor. Each rack can contain a maximum of one canister. Stacking is not allowed nor is it physically possible with the existing rack design. Both basins have equipment in place to suspend canisters over the racks in a "one over three" arrangement but this storage arrangement is not in use and is prohibited by the facility Process Standards. A small amount of SPR fuel stored in K East is in baskets rather than canisters. This fuel is stored in the Technical View pit which is adjacent to the main storage basin.
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION
This evaluation is being prepared in accordance with the requirements for criticality safety evaluations in WHC-CM-4-29, Nuclear Criticality Safety Manual, chapter 4.0.
FUEL STORAGE LIMITS
Fuel storage in floor racks, suspended storage, west bay storage, and storage of 1.25 wt% scrap and single pass reactor fuel are discussed in this section.
Floor Rack Storage
A series of criticality evaluations (Toffer 1975 , Toffer 1976 , Toffer et a1 1980 , culminating in an evaluation of full-density storage with suspended fuel storage (Toffer and Eaves, 1981) were performed to determine the safety of fuel storage in the floor racks. It was determined that full-density floor storage (every storage location filled), with full-density water reflection, has a kef, of 0.755 for MK IA fuel. increased to 0.939. Optimum moderation requires a partial drain of the basin water, an unlikely condition. For a dry basin (water in canisters only) the kef, is 0.876. As MK IV fuel is less reactive, this analysis is bounding for all types of N Reactor fuel.
The initial calculations were verified by performance of subcritical experiments with unirradiated and irradiated N Reactor fuel (Toffer 1976). Finally, subcritical experiments for storage configurations for MK IA fuel (which are bounding for less-reactive MK IV fuel) were performed to verify the safety of fuel storage in K West (Roblyer 1982).
Suspended Fuel Storage
Suspended fuel storage in a "one over three" arrangement was analyzed in Toffer and Eaves (1981) . The worst-case single contingency accident involved spilling all suspended fuel alongside floor-stored canisters at optimum lattice pitch with full-density basin water. The kef, in this case was 0.936, which is less than the safety factor of 0.98. A "one over two" array had a kef, of 0.992 for the same accident; thus this method of suspended storage is not allowed. 
FUEL HANDLING AND MOVEMENT
This section discusses moving canisters on hoists in the main basin, handling in the event of fuel spills, amount of fuel allowed per container, canister decapping at K West, and fuel shipments to and from the basins.
Canisters on Hoists per Storage Bay
Process Standards limits the number of canisters out of storage and on hoists to three per bay, with the further limitation that only one scrap canister may be out of storage anywhere in the basin. The canisters are required to be separated by at least 0.9 meters (three feet) while in transit. Toffer (1975) determined that a spill of one canister into a six canister subarray has a minimal reactivity perturbation. With the canister rack dimensions of 53 cm x 27 cm ( 2 1 " x 10.6") a six canister subarray is 160 cm x 81 cm (63" x 31.8" or 5.25' x 2.7'). A 0.9 meter separation for the canisters assures that a multiple spill from the hoists will not drop more than one canister into the six canister subarray. This accident is also simulated by a drop of suspended fuel in the one-over-three arrangement; canisters suspended fuel in this arrangement would be approximately 0.9 meters apart.
Spilled Fuel
A s previously mentioned (section 4.3), a spill of 1.25 wt% scrap requires a suspension of all fuel movement within 3.0 meters of the spill until the scrap fuel is recovered. Process Standards conservatively applies this restriction to spills of all types of fuel. Sludge heights are measured in the K West transfer channel by means of a four-legged pylon shaped like a jack or caltrop. Three legs of the pylon maintain contact with the transfer channel floor; the fourth extends straight up. Each leg is marked with the maximum sludge height so that no matter how the pylon is oriented on the floor the indicating leg marking is visible provided the sludge depth is within limits.
. Fuel Shipments
Both K East and K West basins are designed to allow for shipments of fuel either to or from other Hanford locations. For shipments out of the basin, fuel is transported to the south loadout pit via the basin hoist and trolley system. Casks which can contain up to three canisters are loaded and removed from the pit by the building crane and placed into a railroad well car. The well car can contain three casks; thus a well car can transport up to nine canisters of fuel. Fuel shipments to the basin are accomplished in a similar manner--the well car casks are lowered one at a time into the loadout pit and the canisters are removed and stored in the basin. Fuel shipped to or from the basin in trucks rather than the standard well cars are administratively limited to contain no more fuel than would be allowed in a well car.
N Reactor Fuel Shipments
A well car containing nine canister.s of 1.25 wt% fuel (M length; see Appendix A ) , holds 2099 kg (4627 lbs). This represents 65% of the hemispherical critical mass of 3211 kg (7080 lbs) (Schwinkendorf 1994). Westinghouse Hanford Company criticality control criteria state that the maximum acceptable k,,,, after any foreseeable contingency is less than or equal to 0.98 (WHC 1994) . This CSER limits the number of loaded well cars in the facility to one and a well car cannot contain more than nine canisters; thus a double-batching accident following a well car spill is not credible.
If the fuel from one well car should spill in such a way as to cause the inners and outers to separate into distinct hemispheres, the pile of outers, which are more reactive, would have a mass of 1404 kg (3095 lbs) which is less than the k,,, = 0.98 mass of 1469 kg (3239 lbs). Thus after two contingencies (the rail car spill and the disassembly of fuel into two piles, one representing the most reactive configuration), the subcritical criteria is satisfied.
If the well car contains nine canisters of scrap, the total mass would be 763 kg (1683 lbs). This represents 81% of the hemispherical critical mass of 941 kg (2075 lbs) for 1.25 wt% scrap; thus even with the more reactive scrap fuel a well car contains insufficient material to exceed a kef, of 0.98.
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Toffer, H., Wittekind, W.D., and Meriwether, G.H., 1980 This report is found to be an accurate and concise summary of the evaluations reported in the past to support the criticality safety limits governing fuel storage in the K-basins, and of the defining calculated criticality parameters. Studies by this reviewer of the referenced evaluation reports, as part of technical reviews on other Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSERs) pertaining to N-fuel element storage, have confirmed the adequacy of the safety margins for unburned fuel, and indicated the extra conservatism inherent to assuming green fuel in the K basins.
Comments submitted from reviews of earlier drafts of this document, including requests for further details of the stored fuel and the facilities, have been well accommodated in this final version. 
